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Abstract 
In communication networks, a large number of alarms exist 
to signal any abnormal behavior of the network. As network 
faults typically result in a number of alarms, correlating these 
different alarms and identifying their source is a major prob- 
lem in fault management. The alarm correlation problem is of 
major practical significance. Alarms that have not been cor- 
related may not only lead to significant misdirected efforts, 
based on insufficient information, but may cause multiple COT- 
rective actions (possibly contradictory) as each alert is han- 
dled independently. This paper proposes a general framework 
to solve the alarm correlation problem. We introduce a new 
model for faults and alarms based on probabilistic finite state 
machines. We propose two algorithms. The first one acquires 
the fault models starting from possibly incomplete and incor- 
rect data. The second one correlates alarms in the presence of 
multiple faults and noisy information. Both algorithms have 
polynomial time complexity, use an extension of the Viterbi 
algorithm to deal with the corrupted data, and can be im- 
plemented in hardware. As an example, they are applied to 
analyze faults using data generated by the ANS (Advanced 
Network and Services, Inc.)/NSF T 3  network. 
1 Introduction 
In large and complex communication networks, faults are 
unavoidable, but quick detection and identification can sig- 
nificantly improve network reliability. A network fault typi- 
cally results in a number of alarms, correlating these different 
alarms to identify their source is a major problem in fault man- 
agement. This problem, often referred to as alarm-correlation, 
is of major practical significance. Rule-based expert systems 
have been so far the main approach to solving the alarm corre- 
lation problem 11, 2, 3 , 4 ,  5 ,  61. Although the effort in this area 
is still growing, most of the existing fault management expert 
systems were built on an ad-hoc basis, transferring the knowl- 
edge of a human expert into an automated system. Recently, 
other approaches based on more formal methodologies were 
proposed. The work in [7, 81 is based on a formal language 
representation of the communication system. A. Bouloutas 
in [7] focuses on identifying errors in a known protocol: it is 
not alarm correlation as such. The problem considered by A. 
Bouloutas and S. Calo in [8] is fault localization from alarms. 
It is a related although different problem. In particular, it 
does not consider the time factor (i.e., the order in which 
the alarms appear does not matter) and assumes knowledge 
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of the network topology. In [9, 101, the authors present a 
probabilistic theory of diagnosis given a set of manifestations 
(alarms). Their approach differs from ours as they do not con- 
sider noisy data. One of their assumption is the “Mandatory 
Causation Assumption” which rules out any possibility of un- 
reliable alarms (i.e., alarms which may not be due to a real 
fault) I 
Our approach is novel in the fault model it is using and in 
the algorithms which are developed. It allows us to automat- 
ically recognise time patterns of alarms associated to a given 
fault and to identify possibly simultaneous faults in a noisy 
environment. It does not assume any knowledge of the net- 
work structure such as its topology for example. It is adaptive 
acquiring the fault models from possibly incomplete/incorrect 
data. 
We model each fault as a probabilistic finite state machine 
(PFSM). The intuition behind the PFSM model is that faults 
often result in a set of possible alarm sequences. This can 
be explained by two main phenomena. As the ramifications 
of the fault spread out away from the fault initial location, 
we will in general observe a sequence of alarms (as opposed 
to a single alarm or a set of alarms in which order does not 
matter). Furthermore, a fault may in general result in several 
possible sequence as opposed to a single one (e.g., depending 
on the state of the network when the fault occurs, the sequence 
generated may be slightly different). PFSMs are excellent 
models for flexibly describing sets of sequences. 
Our approach then divides in two phases. The first phase 
acquires the right PFSM model for each fault. The PFSM is 
built from history data which associate sequences of alarms 
to a fault occurrence (sequences may be corrupted and/or in- 
complete). The data used for this phase could come from the 
network itself, from an expert operator, from simulation, or 
could be provided by an expert system. Thus our system is 
not exclusive with expert systems (e.g., expert system might 
provide initial training data, but be too slow for on-line use, 
or it could turn out that expert systems are suitable for de- 
tecting certain types of faults, while PFSMs are better for 
others). The second phase, given the fault models, correlates 
alarms “on-line” and identifies the fault(s) at the origin of the 
observed alarms. The on-line data is in general an interleaving 
of alarm sequences resulting from a number of faults. Again 
this data may be noisy and incomplete. Note that the fault 
models can be updated each time new data are observed and 
new diagnoses made. The system learns and gets better. 
The algorithms proposed for each phase of our approach 
have polynomial time complexity, and use an extension of the 
Viterbi algorithm [18, 171 to process the corrupted data. They 
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are applied to data from the ANS/NFS T 3  network. PFSM 
models are generated for a set of faults including a bug in an 
implementation of the T C P  protocol, route flapping, and a 
problem with a T 3  interface card. Data resulting from the 
simultaneous occurrence of several of those faults is then an- 
alyzed, and the sources of the alarms successfully identified. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives some defi- 
nitions. Section 3 presents the model used for network faults 
and alarms. Section 4 and 5 respectively describe the first and 
second phase of our approach. Section 6 shows how our a p  
proach was used to  analyze faults in the ANS/NFS network. 
2 Definitions 
( Q ( F ) ,  L ( V ,  4.0 P ” ( F ) ,  p f ( F I 1  P ( F ) ) .  







Q ( F )  = { Q i ,  Q z ,  ..., Qn} is  a f inite set of states. 
L ( F )  = {SI, ..., sm} is  a f inite set of labels (i.e., outputs 
associated to  transitions between states),  
A ( F )  i s  a f inite set  o f  arcs (labeled transitions): A ( F )  & 
Q ( F )  x Q ( F )  x L ( F ) .  Q; ,  Q j  and s are respectively called 
the origin, destination and label of the arc ( Q ; ,  Q j ,  s). 
Po = ( p & , p & ,  . . . , p $ = )  i s  the initial state distribution: 
p z j  = 1 and p z j  2 o V j  
Q j € Q ( F )  
Pf = (p$, ,pfQ, ,  . . . , p $ = )  i s  the f inal state distribution: 
pGj = 1 and pfS j  2 0 V j  
Q j €Q( F )  
P = { P Q , Q ~ ~ }  is  a table, where ~ Q ~ Q ~ ~  i s  the conditional 
probability associated with the arc ( Q ; ,  Q j ,  s), given that 
the process i s  in state Q ; ,  W e  have: 
{ > O  i f ( Q ; , Q j , s ) E A  
p Q i Q J 6  = 0 otherwise 
Definit ion 3 Let  N be a set  of corruption operations o n  a 
sequence of labels. A data sequence S is compatible with the 
P F S M  F if and only i f  there exists a route R generating a 
sequence S’ = s;...sg of labels, and a sequence o f  corruption 
operations N = NI ... Nnc such that S’ is  accepted by F and 
N gives the sequence S when applied to SI: 
N(S*)  = Xi( ... Nnc(S*))  = S 
The  probability of  the pair ( R ,  N )  given the P F S M  F is : 
PF(R,N)  = PF(R)  x P(N)  
where p p ( R )  is the probability o f  R given F and p(N) is the 
noise probability. The  triplet ( S ,  R,N) i s  said t o  be consistent 
with the P F S M  F .  
3 System representation 
Our representation intends to  capture the relation between 
the occurrence of a fault and the alarms observed in the net- 
work (we do not claim to  model the full behavior of the net- 
work). Capturing this relationship leads to relatively simple 
models for the faults which can then be used efficiently to 
correlate alarms. 
3.1 Fault model 
We model a fault as a PFSM (see Def.1) such that the 
possible outputs of the PFSM correspond to the possible alarm 
sequences generated by the fault. 
Network protocols have long be modeled as FSMs [ll, 12, 
131. Communication networks, where a large number of those 
protocols interact are often modeled as a set of communicating 
FSMS [ll]. The FSM capturing the whole network behavior 
has a prohibitive complexity, but our point is that  the PFSM 
approximating the network behavior in term of the alarms 
generated by a specific fault is considerably less complex. In 
some sense, the states of this PFSM can be interpreted as the 
result of some operations such as merger on a number of the 
states of the general FSM representing the network. 
The occurrence of a fault results in general in a sequence 
of alarms as the effects of the fault spread out away from the 
fault original location. The first symptoms are probably no- 
ticed in the immediate “neighborhood” of the fault location, 
other symptoms may later be observed in more distant loca- - -  
The triplet ( Q ( F ) ,  L ( F ) ,  A ( F ) )  is a non-probabilistic FSM. It 
is referred in this paper as the structure of the PFSM F. 
Definit ion 2 A sequence S = S I S ~ . . . S ~  o f  labels 2s accepted 
by the P F S M  F if there esists a O f  ( O r  
tions. The same phenomenon occurs as a results of the net- 
work protocols. Abnormal behavior of the network is detected 
by some of the network protocols, which communicate the in- 
formation to  some other protocols, leading to  a sequence of 
alarms in the network. Because of this propagation effect, se- 





4 1 ~ 2 .  ..a,,,, such that:  
a; E A ( F )  f o r i  = 1 ... m. 
The  label of arc a; is  s; f o r  i = 1 ... m. 
T h e  destination of arc a; is  the origin of arc a;+l,  f o r  
i = 1 t o  m - 1.  Let Q; be the origin of arc a; then : 
ai = ( Q i , Q i + i , s i )  and a i t l  = (Qi+l,&i+2,si+l) 
probability of route R is defined as: 
i=m 
P F ( R )  = P G ~  x P:,+~ x JJ Pa; 
i=l 
- - -  
quences rather than sets of alarms have to  be considered (i.e., 
the time order matters). Moreover, the probabilistic nature of 
our model allows us to capture in a compact form such ran- 
dom facts as the current state of the different protocols when 
the fault occurs (possibly leading to different alarms) or the 
“probabilistic nature” of the fault (e.g., the fault “communi- 
cation card down” encompasses many failures: any chips may 
be down, several causes may be a t  the origin of the failure, 
and in each case the alarms generated may be slightly differ- 
ent). As no restriction is put on the PFSM structure, we can 
capture typical fault behavior such as repetitive phenomena 
where messages are sent and some negative acknowledgements 
are coming back (cycle in the PFSM structure). 
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Note that if two faults fi and f 2  are independent of each 
other in the sense that the occurrence of one fault does not 
modify the symptoms associated to the other fault, then the 
product of the two PFSMs FI and FZ corresponding to each 
fault is a PFSM model for the simultaneous occurrence of f1 
and f 2 .  
3.2 Data (alarm) model 
A fault results in a number of alarms. The information car- 
ried by each alarm may vary from one network to the other. 
The “ideal” alarm would carry enough information to make 
the correlation of alarms trivial (an example of ideal alarm 
is given in [8]). However, as mentioned in 181, the alarms in 
most communication networks are far from ideal, mainly be- 
cause alarms are emitted by devices which have only partial 
information about the rest of the network. We assume here 
that each alarm carries the following information: identifica- 
tion (device name and symptom) and time of occurrence. This 
assumption holds in most networks. 
The alarms resulting from a fault are then modeled as the 
output of the PFSM representing the fault (i.e., sequence of 
labels accepted by the PFSM, see Def. 2). The time infor- 
mation is used to order the sequence. The identification of 
the alarm is used as label. Since the data collected by the 
network management system is likely to be corrupted and/or 
incomplete, we model an observed sequence of alarms as the 
corrupted version of some original sequence accepted by the 
PFSM modeling the fault. Fig 1 illustrates this model. 
Almsg~ne~ntedby  = Output of tho FSM 






Figure 1: Data model: (a) “Ideal” data, 
data. 
(b) Observed 
We define the noise as a sequence N = N I  ... N,,,, of corrup- 
1. alarm addition Addx,n(S) e.g., Adda,z(BC) = BAC 
2.  alarm deletion Delx,,(S) e.g., Dela,z(BAC) = BC 
3 .  alarm change Cx,y,*(S) e.g., C A , B J ( A C )  = BC 
4. order change of two alarms Ox,y,,,(S) e.g., 
The operations listed above can model a variety of real phe- 
nomena. Delays and wrong time stamps lead to changes in the 
ordering of the alarms. Superposition of faults can lead both 
to alarm additions (alarms related to other faults than the one 
studied are observed) and alarm deletions (one of the elements 
supposed to emit an alarm may be dead, therefore the alarm 
is not observed). Transient failures can result in unreliable 
alarms and thus additions. We assume that the operations 
are independent of each others. An observed alarm sequence 
S is then modeled as obtained from some ideal sequence S’ 
through a sequence N of corruption operations: i.e., if F is 
tion operations. The following operations are considered: 
OA,B,I ( A B )  =: B A  
the PFSM associated to the fault, we specify a route R in F 
and a corruption sequence such that (S, R,N) is consistent 
with F (Def. 3). 
4 Phase I: Learning 
Given history data associated to a known network fault, we 
propose to infer its PFSM model. The initial identification of 
faults in the training data could come from an expert human 
operator or a model-based expert system. 
4.1 Formulation 
The history data used to  infer the PFSM model F of the 
fault f is a concatenation of alarm sequences resulting from 
f, S(f) = &(f) ... Sn,(f)! where each sequence Si(f) is mod- 
eled as the Corrupted version of some sequence accepted by the 
fault PFSM model. We formulate the problem of inferring the 
PFSM F representing a fault f from S ( f ) ,  as a cost minimiza- 
tion problem. The formulation is based on [14], where Hart 
proposes a model for the identification of discrete structures 
from observed data based on a formal language description of 
both the data and the structure, and a criterion which is the 
information content of this description. 
We define a complexity cost measuring the PFSM complex- 
ity as: 
Ccomprem(F) = 4 2  log Q + log L )  
where Q, A and L are respectively the number of states, arcs 
and labels of the PFSM F .  We define a cost C,i t (F,S( f ) )  
measuring how well the F fits the data S(f) as: 
where Ri is a path in F (generating an ideal sequence Si.), Ni 
is a sequence of corruption operations, and A(F,  S i ( f ) )  is the 
set of pairs (Ri ,  Ni) such that ( S i ( f ) ,  Ri, Ni)  is consistent with 
the PFSM F (if the set is empty, i.e., S ; ( f )  is incompatible 
with F ,  then Cjit = CO). The total cost of the PFSM F given 
the data S(f) is then defined as: 
C(F, S(f)) = Ccmplea(F) + C j i t ( F , S ( f ) )  (1) 
This cost allows us to trade-off between the PFSM fit to the 
data and its complexity. For comparison with other criteria 
proposed in the literature, refer to [15]. 
Having defined the cost C(F, S(f)) of a PFSM F given the 
data S(f), we can now formulate the inference problem as: 
Problem 1 Given S(f), choose F which minimizes C(F,S(f)) 
4.2 Algorithm 
The problem of minimizing C ( F ,  S(f)) is a hard problem. 
The algorithm proposed here is based on the work presented 
in [15, 16, 171. [15] considers a similar though less complex 
problem (the data was exact and the class of FSMs studied 
smaller). As in [15], we first simplify the search by choosing 
to search only the space of non-probabilistic finite state ma- 
chines, i.e., the transitions are initially considered as present 
or absent. Then, for each non probabilistic FSM considered, 
we generate a PFSM which minimizes the cost C ( F , S ( f ) )  
for this given structure. As the size of FSM space, although 
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smaller than the one of the PFSM space, makes any exhaus- 
tive search impractical, we opt for a local search and settle for 
a local minimum of our cost function. This solution appears 
to be very good for our purposes as shown by a range of exam- 
ples. Section 4.2.1 gives the structure of the main algorithm. 
Section 4.2.2 discusses briefly the complexity of the algorithm. 
4.2.1 Main algorithm 
The algorithm is basically a greedy search in the space 
of non-probabilistic FSMs. We use a local search, where at  
each step (i.e., as new data is observed and processed), the al- 
gorithm searches through the neighborhoods of the solutions 
obtained at  the previous step. The neighborhood of a given 
non-probabilistic FSM is obtained through a set of operations: 
splitting of a state, merging of two states, addition of an arc, 
deletion of an arc, change of the destination of an arc. Once 
a non probabilistic FSM is generated, the algorithm calls a 
routine which produces a PFSM minimizing the cost given 
the structure. The structures or non probabilistic FSMs cor- 
responding to the K lowest cost PFSMs are kept as starting 
points for the next step search. K is a parameter which we 
typically make one, two, or three. Two routines, fit and FSM- 
to-PFSM, are introduced to deal with the corrupted data. The 
fit routine computes the fitting cost Cfit of the PFSMs given 
the corrupted data. This routine can be seen as an extension 
of the Viterbi algorithm -a form of dynamic programming 
[18]- which is an efficient optimal algorithm for correcting 
symbol sequences generated by a FSM (or PFSM) and cor- 
rupted by independent errors (details can be found in [17]). 
The fit routine is more powerful than the Viterbi algorithm 
in that it corrects a wider class of errors including insertions, 
deletions, and multi-symbol errors such as the transposition 
of two symbols. These are important classes of errors for data 
sent by networks as explained in section 3. The FSM-to-PFSM 
routine iterates the fit routine to generate the “best” PFSM 
from a given FSM. This results in an algorithm similar to the 
EM algorithm [19, 201 or the Baum-Welsh algorithm [21] but 
allowing a wider range of corruptions ’. The main algorithm 
as well as the FSM-to-PFSMroutine are described in detail in 
[22]. Fig. 2 illustrates a simple walk through of this algorithm. 
4.2.2 Complexity of the algorithm 
The complexity of the inference algorithm can be esti- 
mated as follows. Let Q and A be respectively the number of 
states and arcs of the FSM. At a given step, the algorithm per- 
forms two main operations: it generates new structures, and 
for each new generated structure it runs the FSM-to-PFSM 
routine. The generation phase is roughly the same as in [15]. 
An upper bound on its complexity is O(Q2As). Because arcs 
not evidenced in the data are not proposed or retained, A and 
Q can not exceed the length of the input string. The second 
phase complexity is dominated by the K iterations of the fit 
routine. This routine is shown in [17] to be polynomial in the 
number Q of states in the PFSM and the number N c  of possi- 
ble corruption operations: its complexity is of order O(Nc&’) 
‘Both the EM and Baum-Welsh algorithms are iterative proce- 
dures to obtain maximum likelihood estimates of probabilities. 
comlvtion co%t =5 
m 
cmt-s.75 . .  
I output I 
Figure 2: Simple walk through of the  inference algorithm. 
(slightly higher than the Viterbi algorithm complexity). The 
total complexity of the second phase is thus O(KNcQ3)).  
5 Phase 11: on-line correlation 
The second phase of our approach addresses the problem 
of the on-line identification of the faults. We formulate this 
second problem as a maximization problem and propose two 
algorithms. Those algorithms interpret the on-line data as 
a set of possibly interleaved subsequences, where each subse- 
quence is compatible with a PFSM F (Le., corrupted alarms 
resulting from the fault modeled by F ) .  Each interpretation 
is given a “likelihood” measure. We choose the “most likely” 
one. 
5.1 Formulation 
Given a sequence of alarms, we would like to decide whether 
a fault has occurred or not, and if a fault has occurred which 
one is most probable. We would also like to detect multiple 
faults if indeed several faults are responsible for the alarms 
we observe. The first step in our formulation is to define a 
model for the occurrence of “no fault” (we denote this s p e  
cific occurrence as fo). In the absence of known faults, alarms 
are occasionally generated. We assume that this generation is 
random, and is the main factor behind the corruption “alarm 
insertion.” We can then model the “no fault” occurrence as 
a PFSM FO with a single state and no arcs: a sequence of 
n alarms is thus “seen” by FO as n insertions2. Let F,,t be 
the set of possible faults (including f ~ ) .  The observed data 
’If the background noise was not random and had some struc- 
ture, Fo could be acquired as the faults models 
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is in general an interleaving of alarm sequences generated by 
different faults where each alarm is generated by one and only 
one fault. Those sequences may overlap (e.g., if a fault results 
in sequence AB and another one in C ,  you may observe ACB 
rather than ABC or CAB).  One of the problems of on-line 
identification is thus to decide which portion of the observed 
data corresponds to the alarm sequence generated by a given 
fault. We define the concept of a p-coverage to formahie the 
idea that different sequences due to different faults are inter- 
leaved, i.e., shuffled together, without losses or reorderings, to 
give the observed sequence. 
Definition 4 Let S = s1 ... s, be a sequence of alarms and p 
be a positive integer. A p-coverage of the sequence S i s  a set 
of p sequences, {SI, ..., Si = st .. .sf’, S,} such that: 
1 .  A given alarm sj is i n  one and only one of the p se- 
quences, i.e.,  sj has one and only one cause (be i t  noise) 
P 
3! (i, 1 )  such that sj = 8: and 1; = n, 
i=l 
2. The total ordering i s  maintained: 
V i  = 1 ,..., p si = sl, s;” = smr and k > j =+ m > 1 
The set of all p-coverages of S is denoted Covp(S). 
5.2 Algorithms 
We propose here two algorithms. Both algorithms process a 
given “window” of data at  a time, producing the most “proba- 
ble” set of faults for every window (if the resulting set is {fo}, 
we conclude that no fault has occurred). The consecutive win- 
dows may in general be overlapping. In certain cases, we may 
choose to  process the most recent alarms at  regular interval of 
time, e.g., process the most recent 5 hour of data every two 
minutes. The “window” of data considered is then whatever 
amount of data came in during the last half hour. This paper 
focuses on the processing of a given window. The problem of 
choosing the appropriate window and overlapping (if any) is 
another very interresting problem, but is beyond the scope of 
this paper. We would just like to note at  this point that be- 
cause of its a’bility to deal with noise (and in particular, with 
additions and deletions), our algorithm proves to be robust to 
different window and/or overlapping choices. 
Let S be the window of data processed at  a given time, the 
set F&,oble = {f;, ..., f;.} given as output by the first and 
second algorithms is such that ( p * ,  F&boblc) is respectively a 
global and a local maximum of (2). The first algorithm is op- 
timal, but of exponential complexity. The second one settles 
for a “good” solution which is a local maximum of (2) in poly- 
nomial time. Both algorithms are based on an interpretation 
routine which assesses “how good“ an hypothesis is. Section 
5.2.1 describes this routine. Section 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 describe 
respectively the first and second algorithm. 
5.2.1 Interpretation routine 
The interpretation routine is based on the fit routine. It 
finds the best possible interpretation of the data (p-coverage) 
for a given set of faults and uses this interpretation to associate 
a likelihood 
The genera’ structure Of the IOutine 
If p faults occur “simultaneously”, the set containing the se- 
quences they generate is a p-coverage of the total observed 
sequence. faults, and a coIrespond- 
ing p-coverage constitute then a possible interpretation of the 
data. Our problem is to find the best possible interpretation 
integer p, a set of 
to the set. 
for the observed alarms. It is stated as a maximization prob- 
lem: 
Problem 2 Let S = s1 ... sn, be a sequence of alarms (possibly 
noisy). Define P ‘ ( S / F )  as the probability of the most likely 
route/noise pair ( R ,  N )  such that ( S ,  N, R) is consistent with 
the PFSM F (Def.  3): 
where A(F,  S )  is the set of pairs ( R ,  N )  such that (S, R, N )  is 
consistent with F .  
Find the integerp* and the set of faults {f:, ..., f,‘.} such that 
the tuple (p*, f:, ..., f;.) maximizes: 
Input: 
1. The observed data S. 
2. A set of faults {fo, f i ,  ..., fp-l} and their corre- 
sponding PFSM models {Fo, ..., Fp-1}. 
3. A set of corruption operations and their probability 
0 output:  
1. The best p-coverage (SO, ..., S p - l )  of S given this 
2. A cost 
set of faults. 
D-1 
P A description of the different steps of the routine follows: 
max P(p/S)P(fi  fi...fp) n P ( S i / F ; )  (2) 1. Build the PFSM E corresponding to the simultaneous 
occurrence of the faults given as input: E is the p-product 
of the PFSMs F1 to Fp’. Note that since a PFSM is the 
product of itself with Fo, the sets of faults considered 
always contain the no fault occurrence fo.  
COvP(S) 
i=l 
S; is the i t h  sub-sequence in the p-coverage {SI, ..., S,} of 
Covp(S) .  P(p/S) is the probability of having p faults given 
S. P(f1, ..., fp) is the a priori probability of the simultaneous 
occurrence of the p faults fi, ..., fp. F; is the PFSM corre- 2 .  Run the fit algorithm with input: 
sponding to fault f;. ‘This comes directly from the assumption of independent faults. 
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The PFSM E 
The data S 
* A set of possible corruption operations and their 
likelihood4. 
3. Let S* be the original output sequence of E given by the 
fit algorithm. 
Let R = al . . .a ,  be the path generating S’. 
Define a p-coverage (Ro, ..., R,-1) of R, where Ri = 
at ... af’ is defined as follows: 
(a) a: E R Vx = 1, ..., l; 
(b) U; E A(Fi) VX = 1, ..., li 
(c) if a; = at and a: = a,,, with y 2 x then m 2 1 
It  is straightforward to check that (Ro, ..., Rp-l) is indeed 
a p-coverage of R (note that (Ro, S,’)= (@,a)). 
4. Let Si. be the sequence generated by Ri. (S,’, ..., S&1) 
is a p-coverage of S’ such that S,? is generated by Fi 
(by definition of the Ri). Let N be the noise description 
given by the fit algorithm. Define NO as the subsequence 
of N containing all the addition operations in N.  Define 
N;(i # 0) as the subsequence of N consisting of the o p  
erations (besides additions) applying to the elements of 
Si’. Define Si = Ni(St). Then: 
Result 1 (SO, ...,&- I) i s  Q p-coverage of s and 
Result 2 (p*, fo ,  f;, ..., f&l) is a global m a x i m u m  of 
(2). T h e  proof follows direct ly from result 1. 
11-1 U - 1  IT PF,(Ril Ni) = max max Pp,(R, N )  
C o u p  ( S) ( R , N )  €A( F; , Si) 
i = O  i = O  
5.2.2 Algorithm I 
This algorithm applies the interpretation routine to every 
possible set of occurrences’. If N is the number of possible 
faults, the number of possible sets is then of order 2 N .  
1. For every tuple ( p ,  fo, ..., fp--l) ,  run the interpretation 
routine with input: 
The set of faults {fo, ..., fp-l} 
The data S 
The set of possible corruption operations and their 
likelihood. 
2. Let ( p * ,  fo ,  f;, ..., f,*-l) = arpi”C(p ,  fo, ..., fp-l) 
4The noise can be a sequence of any operation described in sec- 
tion 3. However, we do not allow a switch operation on alarms 
resulting from two different faults. This operation does not make 
sense within our model where faults are assumed to be independent 
This is ‘Sets considered include the no fault occurrence fo. 
This algorithm although optimal is of prohibitive complex- 
ity. This is due to two main factors. The number of possible 
hypothesis (i.e., sets) grows exponentially with the number of 
faults considered. The number of states and arcs of the PFSM 
resulting from the product of p PFSMs grows exponentially 
with p .  Therefore, the fit algorithm complexity becomes pro- 
hibitive (being polynomial in the number of arcs and states in 
the PFSM). 
5.2.3 Algorithm I1 
We propose here a heuristic polynomial algorithm which 
iterates the interpretation routine. At the j t h  iteration, the 
data Sj is assumed to have been generated by (1) a single 
fault and possibly noise (i.e., p = 2), or (2) pure noise. We 
select the best single fault interpretation, put the correspond- 
ing fault f; in the set of most probable faults, and repeat our 
operation on the data considered pure noise in this interpreta- 
tion. This greedy iterative process is stopped either when the 
entire remaining sequence is considered noise, (i.e., the best 
set is { fo}) or when there is no data left. 
The description of the algorithm follows: 
IKPUT: 2 fault models Addition Cost : S o-’-6 Othar Comptlon 10 1 
On-llne data : 8 c b d 
a c b d  
Try rafithu Try: t&u\
rithFSM1/ vithF&f2 Pure Noire 
OUTPUT: p = 4  C w k  {{rzb), {e), {d)), Fset4 faull2, Rult l ,  noire) 
Figure 3: Simple walk throu h of the  correlation algo- 
ri thm. Cost(x) = - log P(x) &.e., t he  maximization ap- 
pears as a minimization). All values of p and all set of 
faults a re  assumed equiprobable (Le., we ignore the  cor- 
responding te rms  in o ur cost function). 
required for our approach to be systematic. So, the subsequence 
of S corresponding to pure noise, may end up to be the empty 
sequence. 
1. Initialization of greedy search to locally maximize (2). 
j = 0, So = S 
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2. Greedy iteration: j th  iteration 
(a) Consider the data sequence Si. 
For each fault fi in FSct, apply the interpretation 
routine with input: 
The set { f o , f i }  
data S3 
0 Noise description. 
(b) Let fk be the fault corresponding to the most likely 
single fault interpretation. Set f; = fk (fl is the 
j th  element of the set F;,.obablr). Let Si(k) be 
the subsequence of Sj attributed to fo (noise) by 
the interpretation routine when given the input set 
{fa,  f k ) .  
If k = o or S~(JC) is empty, stop 
else 
Set sj+l = S:(JC) 
Go to step 2 
A simple walk through of the algorithm is illustrated in Fig 3. 
The algorithm keeps a minimum of data in memory. Its com- 
plexity is essentially the complexity of the f i t  algorithm, that 
is polynomial in the number of possible corruptions and the 
number of states in the different PFSMs. Furthermore, it 
could very easily be implemented in hardware since it is es- 
sentially based on an extension of the Viterbi algorithm for 
which numerous hardware implementations have been devel- 
oped. Those hardware implementations could handle very 
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Table 1: Alarm Table (Note: ccsat is a utility t ha t  gives 
interface statistics by querying kernel variables). 
We apply here our approach to data generated by the 
ANS/NSF T 3  network. The NSF network is a T3-based net- 
work with 13 core nodes spanning the United States. I t  links 
all National Science Foundation sites, interconnects 818 net- 
works and carries more than 2 billions packet of information 
each month. We consider alarms generated by the simultane- 
ous occurrences of one or more of the following faults. 
Fault (I): a bug in the tcp fin-wait state code 
Fault (11): an interface card is bad 
Fault (111): a T 3  circuit is bad; 
Fault (IV): route flapping (loss of ibgp sessions) 
The training data to acquire the fault models was simulated 
from information provided by experts running the ANS/NSF 
T 3  network. Table 1 lists all the alarms involved and the sym- 
bols used to represent them in the rest of this paper. Fig 4 
show the models obtained for the four faults mentioned above. 
In each case, we also give an example of training data. Note 
that what we refer to as alarms are symptoms checked on a 
regular basis in the network. Any symptom which could be 
checked by the network operator is not considered. Our aim 
is to provide a tool to identify faults automatically, therefore 
only information provided automatically by the network is 
used. Because of this reduced set of symptoms, we may have 
cases where different faults exhibit similar behavior, and thus 
result in similar model. If we were to apply this tool to a spe- 
6.1 Learning phase 
D1.15) 
(b) FSM model for fault II (PIC probabilitied are shown in 0) 
( c ) F S M m o d e l f o r f P l l t m ( a x p r o b ~ i l i t i ~ ~ s h o ~ ~ ( ) )  
DO=JAK/T/3M/3MJAnAK/IAK/J/ .............. 
(d) FSM model for fault N (ax probabilities are shown in 0) 
Figure 4: FSM models of the  faults 
cific network, we could decide, based on the results we obtain, 
to enlarge the set of symptoms that are checked. However, 
the FSMs thus obtained would probably be more complex, 
and therefore the on-line procedure would take more time (as 
it is polynomial in the number of states and arcs in the FSM). 
This results in a tradeoff between the accuracy of the results 
and the simplicity of the technique. 
6.2 Correlation phase 
We have tried algorithm I1 on simple alarm sequences gen- 
erated by a single fault at a time, and it easily identified the 
fault. We give here some examples of noisy alarm data from 
multiple faults. In all cases, the data was generated according 
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to the information provided by ANS. In each case, the algo- 
rithm was able to find the sources of the alarms in less than 
a second. All the faults were supposed to be equiprobable. 
Example 1: Alarms generated by simultaneous occur- 
rence of faults I , I1 and IV. The data is ABEGCJDAD. 
The algorithm correctly recognizes the occurrence of fault I ,  11, 
and IV. The corresponding 3-coverage is {CI = A B C D ,  C2 = 
E G D ,  CS = JA}. Note that the algorithm does not attribute 
any observed alarms to pure noise. Fig 5 illustrates the steps 
of the algorithm in this case. 
hpul: htsdewlng o l d a m  (merated by fault I, I!, and W. ABEGCJDAD 
Alprlthm; 
I A  B E G C J D A D I  
Output: p a ;  Frt-{faultI, InultII, fault IW; C r t 4  {ABCD). CEGD), (JA)) 
Figure 5: Example 1. Heavy lines in the  FSMs indicate 
the  pa ths  generating the  alarms. 
Example 2: Alarms generated by simultaneous oc- 
currence of faults I11 and IV. The data is IHDDJ. The 
output of the algorithm is: Fproboble = (111, Iv, fo} and the 
corresponding 3-coverage {CI = I H D , C z  = J,C3 = D}. 
As we can see one of the observed alarms is considered 
noise. If we make the probability of an addition lower than 
the other corruptions, the output of the algorithm becomes 
is interpreted by the fit algorithm as the corrupted version of 
the sequence I H D F  where the last F is misinterpreted as a 
D. Fig 6 illustrates this example. 
Fptoboble = {Ill, IV} and C s e t  = {ci = I H D D ,  c2 = 3 ) .  cl 
Example 3: Alarms generated by two occurrences 
of fault 111. This example shows how the algorithm is able 
to identify several occurrences of the same fault. Two cases 
are considered non-corrupted and corrupted data. In the 
first case, the data is HIIDHFF. The algorithm produces 
Fpcobable = { I I I ,  I I I }  and the coverage { c ,  = H I D F ,  c2 = 
I H F ) .  If the data is corrupted to H I I D F F  (the H alarm 
resulting from the second occurrence of fault I11 is not ob- 
served), the algorithm still identifies the two occurrences. Its 
output is: Fprcbabla = { I I I , I I I }  and the coverage {CI = 
H I D F , C z  = I F } .  C2 is interpreted by the fit algorithm as 
being the corrupted version of I H F .  Note that Cz could also 
J(.8) A(.8) K( 1) 
(ktput: p.2 Fs&(f.ult Ill, fault W, C r t 4  {IHDD), (J)) 
~)Addition!eulikely[hanothucormptio~ 
Figure 6: Example 2 (heavy lines in the  FSMs indicate 
the  paths generating the  alarms). 
Non corrupted inpul: HIIDHFF 
Output: p-1; Qlct4fault In, lwlt  nI), Get-{ {HIDF), (IBF) 
(4 
Corrupted Input: HIIDFF 
Output: p = 2 ; F ~ t = ( f ~ l t  JJI, fault III).Crctr( (IIIDF), (IF)) 
@) 
Figure 7: Example 3: Two occurrences of the  same fault 
(heavy lines in the  FSMs indicate the  pa ths  generating 
the  alarms). 
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have been interpreted as the corrupted version of H I F .  This 
latter interpretation has same cost. Fig 7 illustrates this ex- 
ample. 
7 Conclusion 
We presented a new approach to the alarm correlation prob- 
lem. A fault is modeled as a probabilistic finite state machine 
such that the possible output sequences correspond to the 
possible alarm sequences resulting from the fault. The data 
model includes a noise description allowing us to handle noisy 
data. Our approach then divides into two phases. A learning 
phase acquires the model of each fault from possibly incom- 
plete and/or incorrect history data. A correlation phase uses 
those models to interpret the on-line data and identify faults. 
Heuristic algorithms are proposed for both phases. Both al- 
gorithms have polynomial time complexity, use an extension 
of the Viterbi algorithm to deal with the corrupted data, and 
can easily be implemented in hardware. As an example, they 
are applied to data generated by the ANS/NSF T 3  network. 
We modeled faults including a bug in the TCP protocol, route 
flapping, and a problem with a T3  interface card. We tested 
the identification algorithm on data generated by one or sev- 
eral of those faults occurring simultaneously, and were able to 
identify the source(s) of the alarms successfully. 
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